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  1 
Interaction and Self-correction 1 
 2 
Abstract 3 
 4 
In this paper I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved 5 
in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the 6 
Naturalist Challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of 7 
conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize two models that have been dominant in 8 
thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models. Both 9 
fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-correction. I 10 
then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help of the 11 
interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in 12 
Phenomenology and Developmental Psychology. 13 
 14 
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1. Introduction 19 
Conceptuality traditionally seems to impose specific challenges to the possibility of a 20 
naturalistic account of mind. The issue I will address in this paper is how to specify the 21 
normative abilities that are associated with conceptual competence in order to meet a very 22 
popular challenge in recent developments of philosophy of Mind, what I will call the 23 
Naturalist Challenge. I do not intend to provide a complete or even general account of 24 
conceptuality but, more modestly, I will try to specify certain conditions that a naturalistic 25 
account of conceptuality should accommodate, conditions that define a framework of specific 26 
questions and concerns, in particular in relation of our capacities of conceptual self-correction, 27 
that lead us, I will argue, to prioritize a certain approach vis-à-vis others: the interaction 28 
theory of mutual understanding. In the context of that general approach, I will claim it is 29 
possible to account for self-correction in a way that is compatible with the challenge at issue. 30 
 31 
Addressing the problem of conceptual competence within a naturalist framework makes it 32 
necessary to meet the naturalist challenge (NC), that is, to account for: 33 
 34 
(1) the evolutionary path from creatures without language or thought to creatures with both 35 
abilities without postulating any explanatory and/or evolutionary gap
1
. 36 
                                                             
1
 It was J. Levine the first to use the expression in the context of the discussion of reductivist accounts of the 
mind. He said: “In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't 
demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there 
being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have 
countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former” 
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Levine.html. Even if Levine was referring to another aspect of the 
mind, the point still applies in relation to the development and evolution of conceptual capacities. The use of the 
expression ‘evolutionary gap’ is meant to emphasize the need of having an explanation of how certain capacities 
evolved from others, instead of postulating a gap in nature.  ‘Explanatory gap’ refers to what Levine calls a gap 
in our understanding, i.e. the insufficiency of a certain set of explanatory tools to infer or otherwise explain 
conceptual capacities.   
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(2) the capabilities of learning or acquiring conceptual contents - and a natural language- 37 
without producing or presupposing any explanatory and/or evolutionary gap or committing to 38 
the existence of non-natural entities. 39 
 40 
And a further constraint: 41 
(3) Answers to (1) and (2) must be able to justify the attributions of intentional attitudes to 42 
children and non-human animals
2
. 43 
 44 
There are two main strategies that have been adopted towards this challenge. Both of them, 45 
when broadly construed, define two general models of conceptual abilities that may be 46 
described in terms of the adoption of a first personal perspective or a third personal one. The 47 
first one, that can be called the first-personal model, includes those attempts to understand 48 
conceptual abilities that focus on the individual’s brain-states, conceiving them as 49 
dispositions or informational states that are related in appropriate ways to the environment 50 
such that they can be conceived as constitutive of the competence involving a specific 51 
concept. According to this model, NC is met because the explanatory work is made by a 52 
naturalistic specifiable notion, i.e. one that can be found pervasively in the natural sciences, 53 
the notion of causation. What makes a state constitutive of the competence according to a 54 
concept is its being properly caused by that to which the concept refers to or is about.  In this 55 
sense, these approaches are causalist accounts of the nature of conceptual competence.  56 
 57 
The second approach I will examine focuses not on the individual brain states but on the 58 
attributive standpoint of an interpreter that can understand an individual´s behavior 59 
conceptually, thus undertaking a third personal perspective. This strategy is known as an 60 
interpretationist account of conceptual abilities. NC is met – so the defenders of this position 61 
claim - because this perspective is not committed to there being any specific reality of 62 
concepts over and above the interpretational activity of taking the behavior at issue to be 63 
explained in terms of the attribution of the concepts in question. 64 
 65 
My aim in this paper is twofold: 66 
 67 
(a) To argue that both causalist and interpretationist accounts of conceptual abilities are 68 
unable to meet NC. The reason for this failure is that both models are inadequate to account 69 
for mistakes in the application of concepts. 70 
(b) To offer an alternative model –a second personal interactionist model- that meets NC by 71 
accounting in a different way for the ability to make conceptual mistakes. 72 
 73 
2. Conceptual abilities: basic notions and constraints. 74 
 75 
There seem to be good reasons to think that no matter how we define conceptual abilities nor 76 
the position we assume concerning the scope of conceptual content and its articulation with 77 
experience, being able to apply concepts presupposes as a necessary condition – though of 78 
course not sufficient –being able to distinguish between correct and incorrect applications of 79 
                                                             
2
 ‘Justification’ in this condition is to be understood in broad terms. Thus, it is meant to cover a broad range of 
explanatory accounts of those attributions, not merely accounts that will take those attributions to be literally 
true. There is nevertheless a minimal constraint that justification places in these explanations.  It requires that 
the explanation of the attributions is based on the abilities displayed in the behavior of the organism to which the 
attributions are made.  
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them in actual cases. This is what we may call the normative constraint on conceptual 80 
abilities
3
. 81 
 82 
Such constraint can be defined as follows: 83 
 84 
(1) To have conceptual abilities involves as a basic ability being able to correctly apply 85 
concepts, i.e. to distinguish between correct and incorrect uses of them in given 86 
circumstances. This means that in order to account for the nature of conceptual abilities it is 87 
necessary to account for the ability to recognize a correct application of a concept and 88 
distinguish it from incorrect ones.  89 
 90 
(2) Conceptual competence does not only involve recognizing an incorrect use of a concept 91 
but also implies to be willing, in that case, to abandon that use and modify it if necessary, i.e. 92 
to self-correct when noticing an incorrect use of a concept by oneself. This means that in 93 
order to account for the nature of conceptual abilities it is necessary to account for self-94 
correction. 95 
 96 
Further precisions are required in order to understand correctly the constraint. As it may be 97 
apparent, the normative dimension involved in the ability to apply concepts involves the 98 
possibility of error.  99 
 100 
There are nevertheless two notions of error or mistake that must be distinguished. In 101 
particular, there are two different kinds of mistakes that we attribute to others in their use of 102 
concepts. On the one hand, we may attribute error to someone when she misapplies a concept. 103 
I will call this misapplication or conceptual mistake. On the other, we may attribute lack of 104 
competence to a person regarding a concept when she lacks the concept or is simply not 105 
applying the concept at all. This I what I will call absence of application. Such distinction 106 
will prove especially fruitful when assessing whether a model of conceptual abilities can 107 
fulfill the normative constraint accommodating the requirements of NC. 108 
 109 
Consider the following cases: 110 
 111 
(i) John has been adding correctly and suddenly says “57 + 124= 171”. 112 
 113 
(ii) John does not know how to reply to a question regarding the sum of two numbers (he 114 
answers randomly, or he simply shrugs his shoulders). 115 
 116 
In the first case we will attribute to John that he is adding wrongfully, in the second one that 117 
he simply is not adding. While (i) is a case of conceptual mistake, (ii) is just a case of absence 118 
of application. The crucial difference lies in the fact that while in the former case the concept 119 
in question is relevant to the evaluation of the action, i.e. is relevant for the way in which the 120 
performance is carried out; in the second case the concept is not relevant for explaining his 121 
performance, it is simply absent
4
. Following our previous constraints, to account for the 122 
normative constraint specified in (1) and (2) above, it is necessary to be able to account for 123 
the abilities that underlie the attribution to a subject that she is committing a mistake in the 124 
                                                             
3
 For a full list of necessary conditions for the possession of conceptual abilities, see Camp 2009 and Scotto 
2010.  
4
 Of course there are cases like (ii) in which we say that John should have been adding and ante that there is then 
an error of performance. But in such cases, what we mean is that he should have known the concept: the 
problem resides precisely in the absence of application of that concept and  not a misapplication of it. 
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use of a concept (conceptual mistake), and to distinguish that case from a case in which the 125 
subject is simply not applying the concept (absence of application), i.e. it is necessary to 126 
account for when and how someone who uses a concept, commits and recognizes conceptual 127 
mistakes and accordingly self corrects her use and to distinguish that case from one in which 128 
the subject is not applying the concept at all.  129 
How should we then understand self-correction in application of concepts? Self-correction in 130 
the relevant sense, seems to involve three dimensions of performance: 131 
 132 
(a) The application of concepts (the actions of applying or misapplying a concept) 133 
 134 
(b) The ability to evaluate (a). 135 
 136 
(c) The modification of (a) according to the results of (b). 137 
 138 
As it will be shown in the following sections, both causalist and interpretationist accounts of 139 
conceptual abilities fail when accounting for the distinction between cases of misapplication 140 
or conceptual mistakes and cases of absence of application and the consequence of this 141 
failure is their inability to meet NC. 142 
 143 
3. The causalist conception of conceptual abilities
5
. 144 
 145 
The way in which competence regarding a specific concept X can be defined in causal terms 146 
is the following: 147 
 148 
John is competent with respect to concept X iff given certain conditions C, John 149 
is disposed to apply X to y iff X(y) is true.
6
 150 
 151 
In this framework, conceptual mistakes are modeled in terms of the failure of a mechanism: 152 
Conditions C are not given.  The reason for this failure might be internal to the mechanism, 153 
that is, that the mechanism is malfunctioning or it might be the absence of one of the enabling 154 
conditions required for the mechanism to work.  155 
 156 
I will claim that when assuming such way of understanding conceptual competence, there is 157 
no non-question-begging way of distinguishing between conceptual mistakes and absence of 158 
application.  159 
 160 
It is important to bear in mind that if John’s mistakes can be accounted for equally as 161 
conceptual mistakes according to a concept, or as a case of lack of application, there would 162 
be no way to account for the capacity to make conceptual mistakes. Say John says “5 + 6 = 163 
12”. We would be immediately inclined to think he was adding and adding wrong. But he 164 
could equally be performing a different operation, say, +*, and doing it correctly. If an 165 
account of conceptual capacities could not distinguish between both cases, it would fail to 166 
explain what is for John to have any conceptual ability and to distinguish this from the case 167 
where this ability is merely absent. 168 
                                                             
5
  Fodor 1992, Forbes 1984, Ginet 1992 are some of the advocates of this approach, although it is much more 
broadly accepted. 
6
  According to the kind of concept, conditions C will vary. They may for instance include normality in the 
subject’s cognitive functions as well proper external conditions, so for example, were the concept a perceptual 
one, then proper conditions of illumination will be included as well as the proper functioning of the visual 
system. 
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 169 
The causalist model fails to provide a plausible distinction between conceptual mistakes and 170 
absence of application at least for two reasons: 171 
 172 
The first reason is that, according to this model, the subject’s reactions/dispositions to apply 173 
concepts can be described in terms of different concepts. So in this model it is not possible to 174 
distinguish between cases of conceptual mistakes and cases of lack of application. As 175 
Boghossian (1989)
7
 famously pointed out, the same reactions can be described using different 176 
concepts. This further requires for the model to distinguish different responses as appropriate 177 
or not in specific contexts, and in order to identify the proper set of responses we need to 178 
distinguish the good cases from the bad ones, conceiving these as cases in which conditions C 179 
fail, in the example at issue conditions C would include John cognitive mechanisms working 180 
fine, including normal functioning of attention, memory, etc.  The problem is that we can 181 
only distinguish the two cases by using the concept we want to reconstruct, stipulating which 182 
is the concept in question, for example, stipulating that when John says that “6 + 5 = 12”, he 183 
is using the concept of addition. But this means that we have to presuppose its content 184 
without accounting for it in terms of reactions, opening an explanatory gap. Importantly, 185 
there is no distinction between absence of application and misapplication that does not 186 
depend on stipulating the concept at issue and thus presupposing the pertinence of that very 187 
distinction. It is important to bear in mind that this problem rises independently of whether 188 
the account takes these processes to occur at the subpersonal level or at the personal one. In 189 
either case there is no non-question begging way of distinguishing that the behavior accords 190 
with one concept and thus is a case of conceptual mistake and not mere absence of 191 
application of that concept
8
. Thus, the proposal fails to meet NC
9
. 192 
The second reason why this view fails to make the distinction between misapplication and 193 
absence of application is that this account does not give a proper account of self-correction. 194 
According to this kind of theory the source of error is a failure in conditions C, but this kind 195 
of error is independent of the subjects being able to identify it in practice. The mistakes are of 196 
such a nature that the subject may be unable to identify them (direct access to them could 197 
even be impossible for the subject) and modify his use of concepts according to the 198 
identification of error and its sources.  199 
 200 
In fact, Conditions C are not conceptually linked to the concepts the subject is applying or 201 
trying to learn. But self-correction seems to be a key ability to account for the process of 202 
learning new conceptual contents through training. Can this theory account for the connection 203 
between the identification of mistakes and conceptual abilities that seem constitutive of the 204 
process of learning conceptual contents and linguistic terms associated with them? As shown 205 
before, they cannot. This amounts to a failure to meet NC, since there is an 206 
explanatory/evolutionary gap concerning how new concepts are learnt and from this 207 
                                                             
7
  Kripke 1982 and Wright 1989 have also argued for the same conclusion. The main claim, as we will see, is 
that the causalist way of specifying conceptual competence is circular, in as far as it presupposes the very 
concept that is supposed to be specifying by the identification of the relevant dispositions. For a discussion of 
this see Satne 2005: ch. 3. 
8
 One might think that I am presupposing that self-correction as I define it is a personal level concept and thus 
unable to challenge subpersonal accounts of conceptual abilities. On the contrary, the definition is neutral with 
respect to this. I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing this point. 
9
 Fodor 1990 specifies the concept in question in terms of higher order relations of asymmetrical dependency 
between causal relations of this sort. But the problem reappears in a slightly different form: postulating 
asymmetrical relations between causal relations in the absence of a naturalistic explanation of why those 
relations should hold merely restates the problem at issue (Hutto 1999: 47-8; Hutto 2009: 22; Cummins 1989) 
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perspective the fact that concept users are able to apply concepts correctly and self-correct 208 
themselves if mistaken seems to be a complete mystery. 209 
 210 
However, someone may hold that there are second order dispositions to evaluate reactions 211 
(corresponding to the component (b) of self-correction described above). The idea would then 212 
be that by positing them it is possible to account for self-correction and still defend a purely 213 
dispositional account of conceptual competence
10
.  214 
 215 
But a similar problem arises: If those (second-order) dispositions were fallible and learnt, 216 
they would require dispositions of higher order to be learnt. This involves a vicious regress. If, 217 
on the contrary, those dispositions are not fallible and learnt, they are some kind of sui 218 
generis dispositions. This leaves their nature unexplained: are they to be conceived in causal 219 
terms? It seems that they must not be, in order to avoid the previous difficulties, but then 220 
another notion of conceptual ability must do the work here. This leads to an explanatory gap. 221 
Thus, the theory fails to account for NC (2) since it cannot explain the learning and acquiring 222 
of conceptual contents in a naturalist way (it fails by opening an explanatory gap when 223 
introducing the sui generis dispositions involved in self-correction). And it also fails to 224 
account for NC (1) since its inability to account for self-correction shows a corresponding 225 
failure to draw crucial distinctions between the capabilities of artifacts and other sorts of 226 
entities, some of them capable of self-correcting in ways that others are not. There is, 227 
according to this model, only one basic kind of mechanism that explains all of these prima 228 
facie different phenomena. But then the proposal fails in explaining the nature and 229 
complexity of different abilities in terms of more basic or previous ones, and so fails in 230 
drawing the relevant distinctions between abilities and capabilities of different complexity in 231 
a natural and gradual scale
11
. 232 
 233 
4. The interpretationist account of conceptual abilities
12
. 234 
 235 
I have presented three dimensions that are involved in self-correction: 236 
 237 
(a) The application of concepts (the actions of applying or misapplying a concept) 238 
 239 
(b) The ability to evaluate (a). 240 
 241 
(c) The modification of (a) according to the results of (b). 242 
 243 
                                                             
10
 Again, the account could sensically hold that this mechanism is to be understood as operative in a subpersonal 
level. 
11
  Another relevant candidate to account for the normativity of conceptual abilities is teleosemantics, a model 
that appeals to the notion of biological function and the evolutionary history of the organisms to explain 
representational content. I won’t consider this proposal in detail in this paper. The main reason is that as Fodor 
1990 has argued, biological function is not sufficient for intensionality: we can explain the behaviour at issue 
according to one concept or other as long as they are co-extensional in the relevant de facto situations. In the 
present context this would amount to a failure to distinguish between conceptual mistakes according to a 
concept and absence of application of that concept. For a detailed treatment of Teleosemantics and the problems 
it rises for explaining conceptual content see Hutto & Satne 2014, where I argue that a story of that sort is part 
of the explanation of the relevant capacities but not yet sufficient to account for the normativity of conceptual 
content  
12
  Davidson 1984; 2001; 2005, Brandom 1994, Dennett 1991 and Stalnaker 1984 are some of the main 
advocates of this approach. Further specifications are required that distinguish their positions. I may dispense of 
introducing such distinctions here since nothing especially important for the arguments presented in this section 
follows from drawing these distinctions.  
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If causalism thinks of level (b) by analogy with (a) and fails to account for (c), 244 
interpretationism stresses level (b).  245 
 246 
Briefly sketched, according to this model to be a conceptual creature is to be a language user. 247 
Both notions are accounted for in terms of interpretation: to be a conceptual creature is to be 248 
able to interpret other creatures’ actions as meaningful. The interpretation of language is just 249 
a part of the global task of attributing meaning to other creatures’ behavior. To interpret 250 
someone is to attribute meaning to their conduct conceiving it as oriented by wishes and 251 
beliefs in the context of a common perceived world. In sum, to interpret someone is to 252 
implicitly construct a theory about the content of their beliefs, wishes and the like, in the 253 
context of a world where both the interpreter and the interpretee are commonly situated. 254 
 255 
The emphasis in this view lies then on component (b), the evaluation of the actions of a 256 
subject according to concepts. Accordingly, the model defines conceptual competence as 257 
follows: 258 
 259 
John is competent with respect to a concept X iff John applies X to y only when 260 
the interpreter would apply X to y, or y is such that the interpreter would have 261 
applied X to it, had his beliefs been slightly different in a way that matches John’s 262 
(assuming that the attribution of the belief that y is X to John respects principles 263 
of rationality, charity, humanity and causality regarding the interpretation of 264 
John’s behavior as a whole)
13
. 265 
 266 
The attribution of error - in the sense of conceptual mistakes- is captured as a difference 267 
between the perspective of the interpreter and the perspective of the interpretee regarding a 268 
special case of application. This may happen in a number of ways. It might be the case that 269 
the subject makes a perceptual judgment about something that is openly accessible to both the 270 
interpreter and the speaker or it might be that the claim involves a judgment that is not 271 
immediately connected to the commonly available perceptual evidence for both speaker and 272 
interpreter.  Both cases are structurally similar according to this theory, even if they are 273 
distinct in terms of the role that each kind of judgment plays for the interpreter to construct 274 
the ongoing understanding of the speaker’s discourse. While the former constitutes the 275 
beginning of the interpretational process, the latter depends on previous judgments 276 
concerning what the speaker is taken to believe, intend and desire.  277 
 278 
The structural similarity resides in that, for the interpreter, to be able to interpret the speaker´s 279 
judgment she would have to assume that the speaker shares with her a vast optimized 280 
majority of true beliefs. Because of the general theory about what the speaker is trying to 281 
convey at that particular moment, the interpreter can then attribute local mistakes to what is 282 
asserted. The difference between the two cases is then that in order for the interpreter to make 283 
sense of what is being asserted she would start by attributing to the speaker that he is related 284 
to the same environment that she is and by that token that he perceives and holds to be true 285 
beliefs about that environment that are the same as those she herself holds. It is only with 286 
specific evidence to the contrary that the interpreter will withdraw this particular attribution 287 
and then attribute to the speaker an error of judgment regarding what both are commonly 288 
perceiving. Error will then be explained as a matter of difference between what the interpreter 289 
takes to be the case and what she can make sense of the speaker trying to convey, taking into 290 
                                                             
13
  I will be following mainly Davidson’s presentation of the central traits of the theory although a similar case, 
with correspondent adjustments, can be made for Dennett’s, Stalnaker’s and Brandom’s accounts. 
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account all the other evidence she has about his beliefs, desires, and the like. The cost of 291 
attributing error to commonly held judgments is so vast that rationality constraints on the 292 
interpretation dictate to attribute a difference between her perspective and the one of the 293 
speaker regarding some other judgment. This is all left on the hands of the interpreter who 294 
can then make sense of the behavior in different ways, all compatible with the evidence. The 295 
rule is always to attribute the less possible mistake, which is just the content of the principle 296 
of charity that governs interpretation. 297 
 298 
This model turns out to be problematic when trying to distinguish between conceptual 299 
mistakes and absence of application – and hence to account for conceptual abilities. There are 300 
at least three difficulties worth mentioning: 301 
 302 
(1) Following the principles of interpretation, the conduct of the interpretee can be described 303 
either way, as a case of misapplication of a particular concept or as a case of absence of 304 
application. The concept of error is just a tool for interpreting another person’s behavior, an 305 
attribution that can be cancelled by a better interpretation. Hence, this theoretical 306 
reconstruction does not distinguish between conceptual mistakes and absence of application. 307 
 308 
(2) The theory presupposes the notion of error precisely as a notion that the interpreter can - 309 
and has to - use. To be an interpreter is to have the concept of belief: to be able to interact 310 
with somebody else is to be able to attribute beliefs to him. The concept of belief in turns 311 
presupposes having the concept of error, of falsehood. But the theory does not explain how 312 
this concept is gained but rather presupposes the need of such a tool; and thus produces an 313 
explanatory gap in accounting for the mastery of conceptual abilities. Moreover, the 314 
acquisition of thought, i.e. of the concept of belief, is conceived as emerging from an 315 
evolutionary gap, since the model seems to be committed to the idea that at some point this 316 
ability emerges but is not clear how it develops from previous more basic ones. The model 317 
then fails to meet both NC (1) and NC (2). 318 
 319 
(3) Because of the identification between thought, talk and interpretation, the theory cannot 320 
account for the ability to entertain thoughts but not to speak a language (as may be the case 321 
with some non-human animals), or for the possibility to have rudimentary forms of thought 322 
and talk (as in the case of young children), and a fortiori cannot describe those abilities as 323 
forming a continuous path of little steps. 324 
 325 
In sum, the model fails to meet NC (2), since it cannot explain the learning of conceptual 326 
abilities as a gradual process. This implies an explanatory gap regarding the acquisition of 327 
language, in particular in the acquisition of the concept of error to be attributed to oneself and 328 
others. For these reasons, the model cannot account either for continuity in nature, i.e. for the 329 
way in which complex abilities of some natural entities emerge through gradual changes and 330 
combinations of more basic capabilities exhibited by other natural entities, and this is a 331 
failure to meet NC (2). And this also means that this kind of theory cannot explain our 332 
attribution of thought to animals and children, such attributions would be at the most mere 333 
“ways of talking”
14
, that would not be justified in terms of the abilities exhibited by the 334 
behavior of such agents i.e. the theory cannot answer to NC (3). This leaves unexplained the 335 
nature of their capacities and the connection between their ways in the world and ours. 336 
 337 
5. My strategy to meet NC: conceptual mistake and standards of correction. 338 
                                                             
14
 For a proposal exactly along these lines, see Hutto 2008. 
  9 
 339 
The above considerations have shown that both causalist and interpretationist accounts fail 340 
when accounting for component (b) of self-correction, i.e. the ability to evaluate the 341 
performance (a).  Thus, in order to overcome their difficulties we need to offer an explanation 342 
of level (b) of the self-correction dimensions that (i) is not reduced to mere causal reactions, 343 
as in the case of causalist models. The strategy is to include an evaluative component that is 344 
not conceived in terms of level (a). Second, the account of (b), must (ii) not presuppose 345 
articulated contentful thought, as is the case of interpretationists account. As in the previous 346 
cases, the account of (b) needs to (iii) have the relevant consequences for (c). 347 
 348 
Before presenting my strategy, there are some distinctions and precisions that are worth 349 
making. The aim to give an account of conceptual competence seems to be a highly 350 
ambitious one and there are of course a number of different proposals all of which would 351 
deserve to be seriously taken into account when analyzing what the correct answer to NC 352 
might be. One issue that is of particular relevance in this domain is the distinction between 353 
conceptual and non-conceptual content. As it is known, many current theories of conceptual 354 
competence attempt to address what I am calling the naturalist challenge precisely by 355 
drawing that distinction.  Nevertheless, I won’t address this specific topic in this paper nor 356 
will I explore alternative attempts to bridge the gap between the conceptual and non-357 
conceptual domains
15
. I can dispense of doing that since what I’ll be arguing for is neutral to 358 
those further worries. It should be noted that my claim is not that all cognition should be 359 
conceptual but rather that to account for conceptual abilities while meeting NC, the account 360 
needs to meet the normativity constraint. So my point is the following: No matter where you 361 
draw the line between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, meeting NC requires giving an 362 
account of some sort of basic cognition that cannot be reduced to mere dispositions but that, 363 
at the same time, can be accounted for in terms that do not presuppose the grasping of 364 
propositional fine-grained thoughts. 365 
 366 
My proposal is to think of this more basic competence as a normative one and to model the 367 
minimal conceptual ability at issue as an ability to respond to standards of correct behavior in 368 
a way that suffices to distinguish between cases of absence of application and cases of 369 
misapplications of the standard
16
. The proposal is then to describe that behavior as a behavior 370 
of responding to specific standards of correction (hence being assessable as right or wrong 371 
according to those standards). Such an account must be one that conceives conceptual 372 
abilities in terms of more than mere causal mechanisms without thus committing to an 373 
explanatory gap concerning the emergence of propositional fine-grained articulated thought.   374 
 375 
We can now define more precisely our question concerning the possibility of accounting for 376 
the normative constraint on conceptual abilities accommodating NC in the following terms: 377 
what features must a behavior have in order to count as a conduct that is sensitive to 378 
correctness patterns (unlike a behavior describable in merely dispositional terms) without 379 
thereby committing to it being explained as depending on propositionally articulated thought, 380 
thus leading to an evolutionary and explanatory gap. 381 
 382 
                                                             
15
 For an overview of the main views that endorse non-conceptual content and discussions thereof, see York 
2003. 
16
 Some may think that responding to a specific standard of correction should not be classified as a conceptual 
behavior, but instead representational, and that we should reserve the term “conceptual” for propositional 
articulated thought and behavior. At this point this will perhaps be a terminological issue. For a proposal along 
those lines see Schmitz 2012, Schmitz 2013. 
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Surprising as it might appear as first glance, I will suggest that the crucial move to answer 383 
this question is to focus our attention into the kinds of interactions that basic intelligent 384 
creatures are able to deploy. This move is not completely novel in the literature. It was 385 
perhaps Dewey 1929 the first to emphasize that second personal interaction is key to the 386 
learning of language- and this is a tradition that one can find exemplified in the later 387 
Wittgenstein as well as in Davidson’s and Brandom’s writings
17
. The crucial point to get 388 
clear about though is what kind of interaction we are referring to. In particular, we need to 389 
specify what features of the behavior at stake, if any, (1) display sensitivity to standards of 390 
correction and (2) are both basic and at the same time sophisticated enough to meet NC.  391 
 392 
A final further constraint on a proposal of this sort is for it to accommodate the available 393 
empirical evidence concerning language and concept acquisition. A first step could then be to 394 
take a look at the available evidence concerning language acquisition. The empirical study of 395 
the way in which such abilities are learned and deployed may help us identify the nature of 396 
the capacities involved. Furthermore, it is obvious from an empirical point of view– or at 397 
least denying it would be highly implausible – that small children do not have fine-grained 398 
articulated thought from the start, so the study of children’s development should exhibit the 399 
possibility of acquiring the capacity to grasp propositional articulated thoughts departing 400 
from previous non-propositional capacities that characterize the child’s earlier stages of 401 
development.  402 
 403 
I will propose that a natural candidate to account for the right kind of behavior capable of 404 
accommodating the normative constraint is what I call sensitivity to correction, that is the 405 
disposition to modify one’s behavior in the light of salient assessments of others with whom 406 
one is interacting. This claim still needs to gain support from empirical as well as conceptual 407 
grounds and I will do try to provide such support in the remaining sections of this paper. 408 
Available evidence from developmental psychology will also provide some interesting cases 409 
of how this second-personal interaction can be conceived. Hence, while taking a look at 410 
empirical evidence, I expect to back up both my claim that a middle path between 411 
dispositionalism and interpretationism is in order and that such middle path is to be thought 412 
of in terms of a second personal kind of interaction.  413 
 414 
6. Examining the empirical evidence from developmental psychology 415 
 416 
As I said, one natural place to look for an answer to this question, framed with NC in mind, is 417 
the way children learn concepts.  418 
 419 
Gergely and Csibra 2009 have argued that adults-children interaction is essential to the 420 
learning of conceptual content. They have conducted a number of experiments that suggests 421 
that there is a crucial difference in the subsequent behavior of the infants if they have learnt 422 
merely by observation - when the children are just observing the behavior of adults - or 423 
through being explicitly taught – i.e. when there is explicit demonstrative reference through 424 
the use of language to the objects the concepts apply to in a context in which the child is 425 
addressed. What they noted is that only in the latter case children generalize the result to all 426 
similar cases, while in the former they conceive of the case as contextually and situationally 427 
bound. This provides us a first indication that interaction plays a crucial role in learning and 428 
displaying conceptual abilities as opposed to other kind of learning, where no language is 429 
involved. 430 
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A second indication that the sort of interaction that humans are capable of might be key to the 431 
development of their conceptual abilities comes from primatology. Tomasello 1999, 2012 has 432 
claimed that chimpanzees are capable of emulating behavior but not of abstracting this 433 
conduct from the situational bound contexts in which they first perceive it. This means that 434 
while they are capable of imitating the use of tools in performing a specific task governed by 435 
their own interests and goals, they do not grasp the general meaning of the object nor of the 436 
end that is displayed in the behavior in a way that can be detached from the context and the 437 
objects they are observing and using in that specific occasion. This fits well with Csibra’s and 438 
Gergely’s studies suggesting that the interactive aspect of learning in humans involves a 439 
capacity to grasp the general, rule-like content of linguistic terms and behavior in a way that 440 
is not available to other creatures, and that this specific learning of general meanings takes 441 
place through particular training instances in the context of adult–child interactions, not being 442 
possible for children isolated from those interactions or for primates other than human who 443 
are not capable of those sorts of interactions (ibid).
18
  444 
 445 
Furthermore, Racokzy & Tomasello 2003 and Schmidt & Tomasello 2012 have studied the 446 
conduct of children regarding the enforcement of norms, and they observed that at two years 447 
of age children not only asses their behavior according to norms, accompanying what they do 448 
with statements of the sort “this is what we do” or “This is how it is done”, but also that they 449 
teach others (puppets but also adults that they identify as outsiders to the community) and 450 
that they complain when others do not conform to what they understand the social norm 451 
dictates in that particular situation. This means that children are ready to understand 452 
normative standards of behavior and to teach them to others at a very early stage of the 453 
development of their conceptual capacities and that they generalize the appropriateness of 454 
what they tend to do to all others with whom they are interacting, expecting them to act as 455 
they do and complaining if they refuse to do so. 456 
 457 
How can this then help us to address NC, considering such behavior is exhibited by young 458 
children but not by other primates? 459 
 460 
As I said before, there are a number of philosophical theories that have focused on the nature 461 
of human intersubjective exchanges to account for our capacity to grasp linguistic meanings. 462 
Brandom 1994 and Haugeland 1990, for example, have suggested that it is our attitude of 463 
treating a performance as right or wrong in particular contexts what makes that conduct right 464 
or wrong, and that this is a socially structured practice, in which we treat each other as 465 
committed and entitled or not to further actions as if we were playing a social game, the rules 466 
of which get specified by us treating the different moves as appropriate or not. Wittgenstein 467 
1953 has also been read as defending a view according to which language should be thought 468 
of as a cluster of games that we play together and that it is internal to those games that certain 469 
moves are allowed or forbidden. The moves would then be correct or incorrect according to 470 
the game in the context of which they are assessed. Nevertheless, these theories are 471 
problematic if, as in Brandom’s theory, the moves of the game are thought to be 472 
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 Csibra & Gergely 2009 have called this specific aspect of the way human beings teach and learn from each 
other “natural pedagogy”. Tomasello argues that primates are incapable of engaging in joint action with other 
primates or humans because they lack the ability to form intentions about other individuals intentions. Here I am 
not committing to the particular explanation Csibra & Gergely give of the abilities in which this sort of 
interactions are based, nor to Tomasello’s explanation, in both cases highly sophisticated Theory of Mind 
abilities seem to be required. Regardless of their explanations, the evidence points towards a key role for 
interaction in the ability to learn and apply conceptual contents. With the idea of meeting NC, I will provide a 
different and less demanding understanding of what is at issue in interaction that accounts for these differences. 
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propositionally articulated or if they imply interpretational stances on the part of the 473 
participants, as interpretationist accounts do. As I have argued before, such positions, if taken 474 
to be the whole story, turn out to be unable to meet NC. So I will suggest that the right place 475 
to look at for is not the domain of interpretational theory but rather a different kind of 476 
interactionism, in particular interactionist phenomenologically based theories
19
. 477 
 478 
Such theories start from one basic insight about the nature of social cognition: the fact that we 479 
are able to understand directly and correctly emotions on the face of others and their behavior 480 
as intentional and goal-oriented from the very first experiences of encountering others. This 481 
has been called ‘primary intersubjectivity’. It involves a kind of recognition of others that is 482 
displayed by newborns and that is characterized precisely by not involving any kind of 483 
inferential cognitive mechanisms nor any mediation through articulated thoughts, such as 484 
attributing states to others. That notwithstanding, it involves more than just mere reactions to 485 
stimuli. More precisely, it involves grasping the meaning of the other person´s reactions. As 486 
Scheler famously described it: “that experiences occur there [in the other person] is given for 487 
us in expressive phenomena – […] not by inference, but directly, as a sort of primary 488 
‘perception’. It is in the blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy” (Scheler 1954: 10). 489 
 490 
Phenomenology then provides us with a different route to understand the empirical findings 491 
of developmental psychology on the nature of normative behavior. It allows us to understand 492 
in what sense we are able to grasp the rightness or wrongness of what we are doing without 493 
committing us to think of this in a propositionally loaded way. According to these theories, 494 
based both in early development psychological studies and a phenomenologically based 495 
explanation of them, there is, from the very beginning of our lives, a way of tuning the other 496 
person’s emotions and it is that tuning, we might think, what first teaches us about the 497 
distinction between right and wrong, good or bad, this way or not-this-way. 498 
 499 
Having taken a brief look at some recent works on Phenomenology and Developmental 500 
Psychology, we have found concurring support for the need to abandon the third-person 501 
perspective characteristic of interpretationism, but also the confinement within the first 502 
person perspective, characteristic of causalism. Such works suggest the convenience of 503 
prioritizing interlocutors’ interactions in face-to-face encounters in which the emotional 504 
recognition of the emotions of others might play a key role in our entry to language. It is in 505 
this domain, I will argue, that we find the kind of behavior that allows distinguishing between 506 
conceptual mistakes and absence of application in a way that does not imply yet the reflective 507 
and explicit grasping of the standard to which we are nevertheless responding. In particular, I 508 
will argue that it is our emotional response to approval and disapproval attitudes expressed in 509 
the interlocutors emotional behavior what allows us to learn from others language and criteria 510 
of correct use for words in contexts of use. Thus, this responsive behavior constitutes a kind 511 
of minimal conceptual competence vis-à-vis naturalist and normative constraints. How this 512 
allows us to accommodate the normative constraint answering at the same time to NC will be 513 
the topic of the next and final section. 514 
 515 
6. Interaction and sensitivity to correction. 516 
 517 
As I have claimed, if the problems of interpretationism and causalism are taken seriously 518 
what we need to find is a form of behavior that is not reduced to causal reactions but does not 519 
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 Trevarthen 1978, 1979, Reddy 2008, Rochat 2012, Hobson 2002 have defended and developed this theory 
from a psychological point of view. Gallagher 2001, Gallagher 2004, Gallagher 2007, Gallagher & Hutto 2008, 
Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 have provided reasons in favor of if from the philosophical one. 
  13 
presuppose the ability to entertain articulated thoughts. Furthermore, I have shown that taking 520 
into consideration the evidence from developmental psychology regarding the learning of 521 
language and norms, the right kind of behavior seems to be essentially interactive. 522 
 523 
Advocators of the phenomenologically based interactionist theory usually draw a distinction 524 
between two different kinds of intersubjectivity that characterize capacities that are displayed 525 
at different stages in the child’s development. First, Primary Intersubjectivity (to be found 526 
from birth) is constituted by the ability to recognize emotions and reactions in other person’s 527 
faces without the use of any theoretical tool in face-to-face encounters. It is a capability that 528 
is primary, not acquired, but innate. The conduct of others is recognized as intentional, as 529 
directed towards an end. It involves temporal, auditive and visual coordination with someone 530 
else with whom the baby is interacting. It is not substituted by other types of interaction but 531 
coexists with them, as a precondition for other abilities and as a complement of them. Later 532 
on
20
, children engage in Secondary Intersubjectivity, a kind of interaction that is 533 
characterized by the ability to identify objects and events in pragmatically meaningful 534 
contexts by shared attention mechanisms (based on the abilities gained through engaging in 535 
the previous kind of intersubjectivity). In this stage, children refer to the adults gaze when the 536 
meaning of an object is ambiguous or unclear. It is in the context of this kind of engagement 537 
with others that children learn a natural language by being taught and exposed to it in all sort 538 
of interactions
21
. 539 
 540 
My suggestion is that the right place to look for the ability of self-correction is in the context 541 
of the capability of engaging in primary intersubjectivity
22
. It is in that domain that children 542 
display a disposition to respond to others, characterized by an attunement to their 543 
expectations and an ability to shape their behavior as a way of responding and satisfying the 544 
demands of others, paying special attention to the kind of response that their behavior elicits 545 
in the adult. This kind of exchanges is possible through common engagements in face-to-face 546 
encounters where the emotions of both are directly perceptible for each other.  The common 547 
contexts in which those interactions take place include objects and their properties, which, as 548 
the interaction evolves and the answers become more stable, begin to be understood as 549 
independent standing qualities and objects. Throughout this process, joint attention 550 
mechanisms among other capacities come into stage and help to develop an early-stage 551 
conceptual understanding and a primitive form of using concepts that will later became much 552 
more sophisticated, gaining independence from particular assessments and responses. 553 
Nevertheless, they will never lose their connection with actual uses and assessments of others.  554 
 555 
How can we then distinguish between conceptual mistakes and absence of application in this 556 
early stage of development? In the previous section, I have examined some relevant work in 557 
developmental psychology on the nature of normative behavior and learning. Those studies 558 
suggest that interactions are key in that they elicit and display normatively informed behavior 559 
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 There is some debate about when exactly this happens among advocates of the interactionist theory, ranging 
from 6 to 18 months of age depending on the author. 
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 Gallagher and Hutto 2008 have claimed that narratives play a crucial role in the way in which children learn 
different perspectives and build a conception of themselves and of others that is enriched vis-à-vis the primary 
and emotional sort of engagement characteristic of the initial encounters with others. Even if this may be so, a 
previous question to be made, following our previous considerations, is how is it that children learn to respond 
to concepts as standards to assess their own conduct.   
22
 Gallagher & Varga 2012 have claimed that the notion of recognition, as an interpersonal demand, that 
occupies a central role in the discussions of moral normativity, should be traced back to its primary location in 
this first strongly psychologically based kind of interaction with others. I am claiming that this recognitional 
competence plays a role in conceptual normativity as well. 
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that is exhibited in the way in which children respond to adults in learning through two basic 560 
attitudes: generalizing (what they take to be correct) and enforcing on others the norm 561 
(actively correcting each other, showing that they are not only passively responding to the 562 
environment but spontaneously conceiving of what they are doing as an standard of 563 
correction to which themselves and all others are supposed to conform).  Accordingly, in the 564 
context of the kind of interaction just described, I will suggest there is a specific ability that 565 
constitutes a better candidate than mere reactions or articulated thought to meet NC. I will 566 
call such ability sensitivity to correction. It can be defined as the disposition to modify one’s 567 
own behavior regarding the application of a specific concept in the light of the consent and 568 
dissent of others with whom one is interacting in face-to-face encounters. Sensitivity to 569 
correction so defined is precisely the feature of human behavior that allows us to 570 
accommodate the normativity constraint without abandoning the naturalistic conditions of 571 
adequacy that constitute NC. 572 
 573 
When characterizing the different levels involved in self-correction (a pervasive feature of 574 
normative behavior), I mentioned: (a) The application of concepts (the actions of applying or 575 
misapplying a concept), (b) The ability to evaluate (a) and (c) The modification of (a) 576 
according to the results of (b). Both causalist and interpretationist account of conceptual 577 
capacities fail to provide a consistent answer to account for the difference between 578 
conceptual mistake and absence of application overemphasizing one of the elements, (a) as a 579 
model for (b) in the case of causalism, (b) as the all-encompassing interpreter’s perspective in 580 
the case of interpretationism. My proposal, on the contrary, is to think of level (b) as 581 
constituted by sensitivity to correction, that is the ability to correct and monitor our own 582 
action in the light of the reactions of others towards those very actions
23
. In this case, (a) 583 
corresponds to a kind of behavior that displays intentionality, being directed towards an 584 
object to which the behavior is responding and (b) corresponds to the dimension in which we 585 
self-monitor our reaction to the object by tuning it to the way other reacts to us and our 586 
directed behavior. Sensitivity to correction is a social disposition, that is, a disposition to tune 587 
our behavior to the assessments and normative feedbacks we get from others in particular 588 
interactions. It is then an evaluative attitude that involves the perceiving and attunement to 589 
the approval or disapproval from others. Finally, corresponding to (c), the way in which we 590 
apply concepts is of course modified through the assessments involved in (b): actually, we 591 
may say, assessing our conduct amounts – at least in the most early stages of the acquisition 592 
of language and conceptual abilities – to modifying it according to the approval or 593 
disapproval of others. 594 
 595 
We may now characterize the difference between conceptual mistakes and absence of 596 
application given the framework I have just presented. This distinction will take different 597 
shapes along the different stages involved in learning and grasping concepts. It will first 598 
consist in the ability to correct ourselves by tuning the other person’s assessments 599 
(monitoring myself through you, trying to make my own the perspective of the other with 600 
whom the interaction is taking place.)  It is a self-monitoring mechanism based upon the 601 
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also perceived, will also play a key role in understanding what kind of performance is expected. I am grateful to 
one of the anonymous reviewers for pressing this point. 
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convergence of joint attention mechanisms that identify what is salient in the context and of 602 
the other’s monitoring of my own performance; the individual monitors her conduct taking 603 
into account both what she is directed to (level a) and assessing it in accordance to the 604 
assessment of others (level b), by then modifying the behavior accordingly (level c). It is 605 
precisely through responding to the other´s gaze and his attitudes of approval or disapproval 606 
that a criteria for the application of a concept in practice can be thought to be in place, as a 607 
standard of correction, hence distinguishing the case at stake from one in which the concept is 608 
not relevant at all, a case of absence of application. The concept in question would be poor in 609 
content at this point and its boundaries blurry. Thus conceptual competence at this stage is 610 
understood as a minimum conceptual understanding: but that minimum is exhibited precisely 611 
by the fact that the behavior is sensitive to a distinction between right and wrong ways of 612 
acting according to specific standards of correction (concepts), and this in turn is equivalent 613 
to there being a right way of acting in the world that the other and I share. Sensitivity to 614 
correction is, we may say, the phenomenological exhibition of the normativity of concepts. 615 
We can thus distinguish conceptual mistakes from cases of absence of application in that the 616 
subject is responding to the assessment of his behavior by modifying it accordingly as will 617 
not be the case if it were a case of absence of application. So, what makes the crucial 618 
difference is sensitivity to correction, a sensitivity that is displayed in actual interactions. 619 
Now, as learning progresses, self-correction gains independence from the presence of actual 620 
assessors. And then the subject self-corrects herself according to different actual or imagined 621 
scenarios and perspectives that she can reenact. Sociability is still a pervasive and crucial 622 
element of self-correcting behavior but is now exhibited as the very idea that I can be wrong 623 
according to different standards (which equates to the idea that there are other perspectives)
24
.  624 
 625 
Finally, it is time to consider whether the tools just introduced are capable of properly 626 
meeting NC when accounting for the normative dimension involved in concept use. I cannot 627 
provide in this paper a detailed and all-encompassing answer to NC but, as it will be shown 628 
next, this proposal can give a proper general strategy to meet NC. This general strategy 629 
consists in identifying sensitivity to correction as the middle step between mere causal 630 
responses to the environment and contentful propositional attitudes. While the latter imply 631 
complete independence, flexibility, detachability and general inferential articulation; the 632 
former, on the contrary, only amounts to nomological covariances between states and objects 633 
that may fail given an open number of contextual variations. The important point is that 634 
between these two ends of the invisible line of development and evolution there are as well 635 
different intermediate stages. 636 
 637 
Following this strategy we can then give a general outline of the evolutionary path from 638 
creatures without language or thought to creatures with both abilities. In a first very elemental 639 
level there may only be reactions to stimuli, being error just a failure in causal mechanisms. 640 
The true normative dimension emerges precisely when sensitivity to correction enters into 641 
stage, displaying the ability to interact with others (same species, interspecies) in a primary 642 
interaction sort of exchange. This hypothesis is supported from the fact, underlined by many 643 
evolutionary theories (Tomasello 2013, Rakoczy & Tomasello 2003, Tomasello 1999), that 644 
the main evolutionary step that distinguishes humans from other species is the ability to 645 
engage in social interactions of a highly sophisticated nature. Accordingly, in this stage 646 
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subjects are capable of applying concepts independently of stimuli and are capable of 647 
applying the same concept to different objects and different concepts to the same object
25
, 648 
ultimately gaining the capacity to associate language items with meanings (norms of use of 649 
sounds and marks). Thus, the well-acknowledged idea of sociality as the trait characteristic of 650 
the emergence of the human
26
, when understood in terms of sensitivity to correction, can also 651 
explain the emergence of normative behaviors without any explanatory gap. The possibility 652 
of interpreting others and ourselves explicitly as following or failing to follow certain norms 653 
or rules, an ability that involves already propositionally articulated thoughts, is to be gained 654 
by engaging in earlier forms of sociality
27
. 655 
 656 
A similar point can be made regarding the question of ontogenesis, where practical 657 
engagements with others in face-to-face encounters (primary intersubjectivity) that display a 658 
primitive form of sensitivity to correction progressively lead to secondary intersubjectivity, as 659 
a form of interaction involving shared attention mechanisms, monitoring and correcting, in 660 
the context of which language is learned. Learning is a process in which the child eventually 661 
gets to be a competent user. At the beginning she may need guidance and mainly self-correct 662 
when assessed negatively but later on, she will try herself to repeat this correcting behavior 663 
thus generalizing what is learnt and gaining autonomy in self-assessing her own behavior. 664 
Once again, the third-personal interpretative stance can only get into the picture much later 665 
once the full inferential capacity and the capability of complex interpretation processes are in 666 
place. 667 
 668 
7. Concluding Remarks 669 
 670 
I have claimed that two of the most popular theories that account for conceptual competence 671 
fail when considered against the background of both the Naturalist Challenge, i.e. the 672 
challenge of accounting for both the ontogeny and phylogeny of conceptual thought without 673 
explanatory or evolutionary gaps, and the Normative constraint, i.e. the distinction between 674 
conduct that is guided by an standard of correction and the conduct that can only be 675 
externally assessed as responding to concepts. 676 
 677 
Following some insights from Developmental Psychology and Phenomenology, I have 678 
presented an alternative framework, interactionist theory, in the context of which the 679 
normativity constraint is accommodated in the domain of actual interactions with others in 680 
the learning of language and concepts. My central claim was that sensitivity to correction is a 681 
social evaluative disposition that tunes us to other people’s assessments of our behavior in 682 
actual interactions and allows us to learn from them standards of correction for our actions. 683 
This kind of disposition is what makes the difference evolutionarily and in terms of 684 
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individual development. The fact that human sociality is the main difference between us and 685 
other species is pervasively accepted and has independent grounds in evolutionary studies. If 686 
we can make sense of the connection between conceptual informed behavior and social 687 
behavior, as we have proposed we can, then this gives indirect support to the idea that this 688 
might be the crucial step in the evolutionary story of the human species.  As for the case of 689 
human learning, I argued that recent studies in developmental psychology suggest that it is 690 
precisely our ways of engaging with others and understanding them what underlies our 691 
capacity to learn from each other the kind of general and abstract meanings that we then 692 
deploy in our social lives. The so often underlined social character of human life may find in 693 
the idea of sensitivity to correction a further specification capable of illuminating the way in 694 
which language and thought emerge.  695 
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